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Patent Protection of Computer Programs
*

James P. Chandler

INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 1999, in AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications Marketing, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“C.A.F.C.”) wrote that “this
case asks us once again to examine the scope of [computer
1
program patentability under] section 101 of the Patent Act.”
This article examines whether computer programs are, or
ought to be, patentable subject matter under section 101 of the
Patent Act. Second, it considers whether computer programs
satisfy the utility and novelty requirements of section 102. And
finally, it examines the problem of obviousness, and judgments
thereabout, as required by section 103. The most nettlesome
problem under the statute is whether computer programs, or
software, are patentable subject matter. This is troublesome
because there is no uniform definition of what constitutes a
computer program. The problem is further confounded by the
fact that many have presumed that a computer program is
analogous to an algorithm, which has been judged nonpatentable subject matter; hence, computer programs, like
algorithms, are non-patentable subject matter. Some United
States Supreme Court decisions have been cited as authority
2
I disagree with such interpretation.
for this proposition.
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1. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
2. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584 (1978); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981).
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Others have suggested that the lower federal courts, in
particular the C.A.F.C., have modified the ruling of the United
States Supreme Court to permit algorithms to be patented, and
3
hence have approved the patenting of computer programs.
This article examines the development of the law
governing the patentability of computer programs, reviews with
particularity patents that have been approved by the courts,
and identifies the technical legal justification for decisions by
the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the courts to
reject applications for patents on computer programs and to
allow others. Finally, the article suggests a pathway for the
PTO and the courts in resolving issues concerning the future
patentability of computer programs.
I.

THE LEGAL PROBLEM

Historically, the typical inventor of a patentable invention
proceeded from conception of the invention to articulation of the
invention into some tangible form. This process became known
as reduction to practice; hence, the inventor’s progress from
conception of the invention to construction of a model or other
proof that the invention is indeed workable is reduction to
practice. Upon reducing an invention to practice, the subject
matter of the invention came to exist in some tangible,
workable form. For example, an inventor conceives a new type
of pencil. When conceived by the inventor, the pencil exists in
contemplation of the mind only.
After the inventor
manufactures a sample of his pencil, the conception of the
pencil has been reduced to a tangible form. He has built a
model of the pencil. This is the process of converting the
invention from a state of intangibility to a state of tangibility—
i.e., reducing it to practice. In such a case, the utility of the
non-computer program invention becomes demonstrable.
But an invention of a computer program is different from
historic inventions. The computer program is intangible in
conception and remains intangible even after reduction to
practice. Therefore, from conception to reduction to practice,
the invented computer program remains intangible. The

3. See, e.g., J.P. Chandler, Proprietary Protection of Computer Software,
U. BALT. L. REV. 195, 230-34 (1982).
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computer program at conception is perceivable only in
contemplation by the mind. And after reduction to practice, it
is still only perceivable in contemplation by the human mind.
As a result of the continuing intangibility of computer
programs, even after they have been reduced to practice, it is
difficult to apprehend how a computer program can, or ought
to, be one of the useful arts. Patentability of computer
4
programs thus presents an ongoing challenge.
The primary legal obstacle to issuing patents for computer
programs has been that computer programs are generally
developed using principles of mathematics and logic. This has
lead some to argue that all computer programs are mere
algorithms, and that all algorithms are mathematical and
5
therefore unpatentable as principles of nature. Mathematical
algorithms have been held unpatentable by the United States
6
Supreme Court.
II. ARE COMPUTER SOFTWARE PRODUCTS
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER?
Doubts about whether computer programs are
appropriately patentable subject matter under section 101 have
7
existed from the earliest days of the computer sciences. It is
not clear that one can overcome the substantial doubts that
were raised at the birth of computer programs and which
continue to be a problem. There are doubts about whether
computer programs encroach upon the functions of the human
8
brain. There are doubts about whether the existing patent law

4. Indeed, the fact that much of the work done by computer programs
cannot be seen with the naked eye itself presents a problem. However, an
innate sense of right and wrong suggests that one should be able to protect a
computer program or other computer software from being taken and used by
someone other than its author. This is particularly relevant in a society that
is dependent upon, and is virtually governed by, computer driven technologies.
Computer technology is easily duplicated once someone has the technology in
hand. Intellectual property laws were written to protect individuals and
business entities from having their inventions utilized without permission.
See generally Chandler, supra note 3 (discussing in detail protection methods
for computer software).
5. See id. at 231.
6. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); see also discussion
infra note 22.
7. See Chandler, supra note 3, at 234-53.
8. See id. at 235-36.
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is broad enough to accept programs as patentable. There are
doubts about the meaning of court decisions on program
10
There are even doubts about the wisdom of
patentability.
11
protecting computer programs under patent law.
A. COMPUTER PROGRAM ALGORITHMS AND PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATTER
Before the advent of computer programs, the mental steps
doctrine had been developed by the courts to help define the
12
Under the doctrine, if the
scope of patentable inventions.
process on which a patent was sought was also performable in
the human brain, the patent application should be denied, for
to grant a patent on the process would preclude others from
13
performing the process as mental steps in the brain. Such a
monopoly, it was reasoned, would be too broad as it would
include the power to stop others from using their brains to
14
perform the mental steps in the process.
B. SCOPE AND DESIRABILITY OF PATENT PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The large number of articles published on the subject of
computer software patentability during the last twenty years
illustrates the great interest of both the software industry and
15
the legal community in this form of proprietary protection.
9. See id. at 234.
10. See id. at 230.
11. See id. at 231-34.
12. See id. at 234-36.
13. See id. at 236.
14. See id. at 234-37.
15. From 1970-79, there were over 200 articles on patenting computer
programs; from 1980-89, there were over 500 articles on patenting computer
programs; and from 1990-2000, there were well over 1000 articles. The
following is a select list of important articles, comments, and notes: John
Kasdan, Symposium, Obviousness and New Technologies, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 159 (1999); David A. Rice, Third Party
Intellectual Property Rights and Contractual Restrictions: Implications for
Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 159 (1999); Comment, Are Beauregard’s Claims Really Valid?, 17 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 347 (1998); Dennis S. Karjala, The
Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of Computer
Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41 (1998); Dean Ronald
Cass, Symposium, Protecting Software and Information on the Internet, 3 B.U.
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J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2 (1997); John A. Gibby, Software Patent Developments: A
Programmer’s Perspective, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61 (1997);
Brian Richard Yoshida, Claiming Electronic and Software Technologies: The
Effect of the Federal Circuit Decisions in Alappat, Warmerdam, and Lowry on
the Claiming of Mathematical Algorithms and Data Structures, 45 BUFF. L.
REV. 457 (1997); Karen E. Georgenson, Comment, Reverse Engineering of
Copyrighted Software: Fair Use or Misuse?, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 291
(1996); Lawrence D. Graham and Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient
Treatment of Computer Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection, and
Disclosure, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293 (1996); Charles R.
McManis, Taking Trips on the Information Superhighway: International
Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Technology, 41 VILL.
L. REV. 207 (1996); Judith A. Szebes, Comment, Maximizing Protection for
Computer Software, 12 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 173 (1996); David L.
Bohan, Note, Computer Programs: Abstract Ideas or Patentable Subject
Matter?, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 809 (1995); Michael A. Dryja, Looking to the
Changing Nature of Software for Clues to Its Protection, 3 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. J. 109 (1995); Sunny Handa, Reverse Engineering Computer Programs
Under Candian Copyright Law, 40 MCGILL L.J. 621 (1995); Lawrence Kass,
Comment, Computer Software Patentability and the Role of Means-PlusFunction Format in Computer Software Claims, 15 PACE L. REV. 787 (1995);
C. Mark Kittredge, The Federal Circuit and Non-Patentable Subject Matter
Under In Re Alappat and In Re Warmerdam, 11 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 261 (1995); Sunil R. Kulkarni, All Professors Create Equally: Why Faculty
Should Have Complete Control Over the Intellectual Property Rights in Their
Creations, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 221 (1995); Joseph G. Aresenault, Comment,
Software Without Source Code: Can Software Produced by a Computer Aided
Software Engineering Tool Be Protected?, 5 ALB L. J. SCI. & TECH. 131 (1994);
Thomas P. Burke, Note, Software Patent Protection: Debugging the Current
System, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1115 (1994); S. Carran Daughtrey, Note,
Reverse Engineering of Software for Interoperability and Analysis, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 145 (1994); Susan E. Dallas, Comment, Computer Copyright Protection
Narrows as Video Game Giants Battle in Atari v. Nintendo, 71 DENV. U.L.
REV. 739 (1994); Aram Dobalian, Note and Comment, Copyright Protection for
the Non-Literal Elements of Computer Programs: The Need for Compulsory
Licensing, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 1019 (1994); David A. Rice, Sega and Beyond:
A Beacon for Fair Use Analysis . . . At Least As Far As It Goes, 19 DAYTON
L.REV. 1131 (1994); A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright Than for
Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351 (1993); Rafael X.
Zahralddin, Note, The Effect of Broad Patent Scope on the Competitiveness of
United States Industry, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 949 (1992); Stephen A. Becker,
Note, Drafting Patent Applications on Computer-Implemented Inventions, 4
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237 (1991); John Swinson, Copyright or Patent or Both: An
Algorithmic Approach to Computer Software Protection, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
145 (1991); Randall M. Whitmeyer, Comment, A Plea for Due Processes:
Defining the Proper Scope of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 NW.
U.L. REV. 1103 (1991); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case
Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer ProgramRelated Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring
Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (1987); Note,
Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions: A Criticism of the PTO’s View on
Algorithms, 54 Geo Wash. L. Rev. 871 (1986); Pamela Samuelson, Symposium,
The Seminconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and Its Lessons: Creating a
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Patent protection is comprehensive, surpassing copyright and
16
trade secret law in its benefits to the holder. Patents would
afford software manufacturers protection for both the
substance and form of the inventive concepts embodied in
computer programs, giving the patent holders a limited
monopoly on their invention, enforceable without a showing of
17
These advantages make it easy to
unethical acquisition.
understand why the software industry has sought to have its
products included within the scope of federal patent
18
protection. However, the questions of whether and to what
extent computer programs are patentable remain unresolved.
Courts and the PTO are constantly seeking resolution of these
questions, within the precedents set and latitude left by prior
case law, and the language and requirements of the patent
19
statute.
Patent, as a means of protecting computer software-related
intellectual property, is a relatively new doctrine. It should be
noted that, unlike copyright and trade secret, patent protection,
to the extent it is available at all, has only involved computer
programs and not databases. While it is conceivable that an
application for a patent on a computer program might include a
New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to
Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1985); Lynne B. Allen, Note, The
Patentability of Computer Programs: Merrill Lynch’s Patent for a Financial
Services System, 59 Ind. L.J. 633 (1983). For a comprehensive bibliography,
see Robert O. Nimtz, Development of the Law of Computer Software Protection,
61 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 3, 26-43 (1979).
16. See Eric Cohen, Patentability of Computer Programs, 27 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 494, 496-97 (1973). See generally Susan Nycum, Legal Protection for
Computer Programs, 1 COMPUTER/L.J. 1, 72-73 (1978).
17. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 496.
18. Nevertheless, conflicting opinions exist as to the desirability of patent
protection for computer software. The hardware industry, perhaps the
strongest opponent to software patentability, cites two adverse effects on that
industry if software patents are allowed. Scaffetta, Computer Software
Protection: The Copyright Revision Bills and Alternatives, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. &
PROF. 381, 393 (1975). First, the existence of patent monopolies on computer
software may impede effective development and utilization of computers. See
id. Second, hardware manufacturers believe that the acceptance of software
as a machine process will lead to the conclusion that the bundling of free
software and priced hardware constitutes an antitrust violation as an illegal
tie-in arrangement. See id. at 394. In contrast, software manufacturers assert
that if patents are not allowed, software developers will be forced to seek
protection from state trade secret laws. See id. at 394-95. Moreover,
unpatentability allegedly thwarts university research and diminishes the
staying power of minority groups in the software industry. See id.
19. The Patent Act of 1952 is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1999).
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database as one of its elements, it is unlikely that any patent
protection for the contents of the database will exist. To do so
would be to grant a monopoly on the use of information,
seemingly the province of copyright.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
20
A method,
the conditions and requirements of [the Act].”
apparatus, or combination of the two may be patented,
including a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
21
composition of matter, or material. However, the Act has been
interpreted to exclude mathematical, mental, and logical
formulae, methods or steps, ideas, discoveries of natural laws
or physical phenomena, methods of doing business, and printed
22
matter. The question arising as to software patentability is
whether such products fall within the statutory classes of
subject matter, which evolved before the advent of computer
technology and, therefore, understandably fail to expressly
23
include computer software.
Any submission for patent protection must be novel, useful,
24
and nonobvious. The invention cannot have been previously
“known or used by others in this country, or patented or
25
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country.”
“Usefulness” has been interpreted to mean that the submitted
26
invention must do something, in the technological sense. The
Patent Act explains the nonobvious requirement as follows:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to

20. Id. § 101.
21. See id. § 100(b). As terms of art in patent law, “process” is
interchangeable with “method” and “apparatus” with “machine.”
In re
Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 160-61 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Rich, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (“[G]iven an invention which is in essence a new
program for a general purpose digital computer, a competent draftsman can
readily define the invention as either a process or machine or both.”).
22. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
23. See generally Chatfield, 545 F.2d at 159 (Rich, J., dissenting).
24. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1999).
25. Id. § 102.
26. See Isenstead v. Watson, 157 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 1957). See
generally 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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27

which said subject matter pertains.

Sections 111 through 146 of the Act detail the procedure
28
that a patent applicant must follow. Section 112, for example,
requires the applicant to disclose his invention with specificity:
The specificity shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
29
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

The successful applicant, as patentee, is granted “the right
to exclude others from making, using, or selling” the invention
throughout the United States for a period of twenty years from
30
Sections 271 through 293 of the Act
the application date.
31
32
define patent infringement, providing for a civil action in
27. Id § 103. In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the United
States Supreme Court shed some light on how nonobviousness is to be
measured. First, the prior art must be determined; next, the differences
between it and the claimed invention must be assessed; and then the ordinary
level of skill in the pertinent art must be resolved. Id. at 17. Consideration
will also be given to “commercial success,” “the failure of others,” and “long felt
but unsolved needs.” Id.
28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-146. A person seeking a patent must file the
application with the Commissioner of Patents so that the application may be
inspected by an examiner. See id. § 111. The claim can be submitted and
rejected several times before it is refined to an acceptable level of novelty. See
id. § 132. If a rejected claim is not prosecuted within six months, it is
considered abandoned. See id. § 133. An applicant may take a twice-rejected
claim to the Patent Office Board of Appeals. See Id. § 134. If denied relief
there, he may either appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit or bring suit against the Commissioner of Patents in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See id. §§ 134, 141.
Should the applicant prevail in either of these courts, then a patent is directed
to be issued by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. See id. §§ 145146.
29. Id. § 112.
30. See id. § 154; see also Marshall Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law
26 (1995).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 271. The meaning of infringement has been defined by the
courts through the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.
v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950). Under this judicially
developed doctrine, a court may find literal infringement “where the infringing
device . . . is identical to the supporting disclosure of the patent or can be
found as taught within the disclosure of the patent.” Scafetta, Programming
Technology as an Infringement, 5 AM PAT. L. ASS’N Q. J. 35, 38 (1977).
However, if the infringing device “performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result,” a patentee may invoke
the doctrine of equivalents even if the infringing device is not identical to that
suggested by his disclosure. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608-09 (quoting
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
One
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which a patentee can recover damages “adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
33
infringer.”
Despite the apparent inclusion of computer programs
within the statutory framework of the Patent Act, the PTO
34
declared them unpatentable in its 1968 guidelines. The PTO
35
eventually rescinded these guidelines, largely because the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”) refused to
36
adhere to them. Today, the PTO has established Technology
Center 2700, which issues 25,000 computer technology patents
37
During the last two decades, decisions of the
per year.
38
C.A.F.C. have contributed most to the growth of the law. Only
rarely has the United States Supreme Court spoken on the
39
issue, and on all but one occasion, it has reversed the
40
C.C.P.A. Therefore, the status of program patentability can
commentator has noted that “the doctrine of equivalents, which is especially
applicable to a many-stepped process such as a computer program, prevents a
prospective infringer from avoiding infringement liability by substituting for a
part of the process its equivalent.” Cohen, supra note 16, at 496.
When a software inventor succeeds in obtaining a patent, how much
practical protection will it afford him? Certainly if literal infringement is
found, as where a software programming method is copied by an unauthorized
infringer, the software patent holder will be entitled to damages. See Milgo
Elec. Corp. v. United Telecomm., Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. 639 (D. Kan. 1978).
Since the commercial debut of computer software and hardware, the
Supreme Court has not spoken on the effect of the doctrine of equivalents or
on the broadness of patent protection for means plus function claims. See id.
at 38. Some lower courts, however, have addressed these issues. See, e.g.,
York Racing Assoc. Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 553
F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1977); Bullard Co v. General Electric Co., 234 F. Supp. 995
(W.D. Va. 1964), aff’d, 348 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1965).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 281.
33. Id. § 284.
34. 33 Fed. Reg. §§ 15609-10 (1968).
35. 34 Fed. Reg. § 15724 (1969).
36. See, e.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), aff’d on reh’g,
415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
37. See Gerald Goldberg, Original Patents Issued Per Fiscal Year for TC
2700, (unpublished study, available in app. 1, infra).
38. See National Intellectual Property Law Institute, Occasional Paper
#19, 1999 (unpublished paper, on file with the Minnesota Intellectual Property
Review).
39. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), aff’g 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A.
1979).
40. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), rev’g In re Flook, 559
F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), rev’g In re
Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Dann v. Johnston, 502 F.2d 765
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best be understood in light of the history of Patent Office Board
of Appeals, C.A.F.C. and the U.S. Supreme Court.
Patentability requirements, oversimplified, dictate that in
order to obtain the monopoly given by Congress in Title 35, the
41
invention or discovery must be patentable subject matter, it
42
must be novel and unknown, and it must not have been
obvious to someone of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
43
invention or discovery. Disclosure must be in sufficient detail
and clarity that a person skilled in the art can make and use
44
the invention or discovery.
Computer program patentability’s greatest obstacle to date
has been section 101. Initially it was thought that because
computer programs involved math, which consists of universal
principles akin to laws of nature, programs were not patentable
45
The cases below show the PTO’s slow and
subject matter.
painful acceptance of computer programs as patentable subject
matter. Since the sequence in which the PTO examines
applications for patents requires first a determination of
whether the subject matter is patentable (traditionally the
Achilles heel for programs), many courts have focused mainly
46
on that question.
C. THE MENTAL STEPS DOCTRINE
A process that comprises mental activity, such as
“selecting,” “determining,” or “observing,” is devoid of any
47
These processes, under the mental
physical manipulation.
48
steps doctrine, were unpatentable.
The rationale for the
mental steps doctrine was to insure that a patentee could not
49
obtain a monopoly on thought processes. It was based on the
(C.C.P.A. 1974).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1999).
42. Id. § 102.
43. Id. § 103.
44. See id. § 112.
45. See generally John A. Gibby, Software Patent Developments: A
Programmer’s Perspective, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293 (1997).
46. Compare Gerald Goldberg, Examination Procedures for ComputerRelated Inventions, (Feb. 27, 1996) (unpublished chart, available in app. 2,
infra), with Gerald Goldberg, Revised Examination Procedures for ComputerRelated Inventions, (2000) (unpublished chart, available in app. 2, infra).
47. See generally Chandler, supra note 3, at 234-39.
48. See id. at 236-39.
49. See id. at 238.
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idea that only processes that manipulate physical things were
50
patentable.
There is and ought to be a continuing concern
about the possibility that a process performable on a computer
with a computer program might overreach and empower a
computer program owner to restrict human thought. It is
important to understand the mental steps doctrine because it
existed before the issue of the patentability of computer
programs matured and it reflects the general societal concern
that human thought should remain free and unfettered. The
value of free thought and protection of creations of the mind are
mutually dependent values in every human society. Individual
freedom of thought and protection of the creations of the mind
of the individual for the benefit of the individual are paramount
values and should always be preserved for the good of all in
human society.
The question of whether the mental steps doctrine
constitutes a barrier to patentability of certain inventions was
51
presented in In re Abrams. The appellant in Abrams sought a
reversal of the PTO Board of Appeals’s decision rejecting a
method (or process) claim for prospecting for petroleum
52
The Abrams court proposed three rules for
products.
53
analyzing claims that included mental steps.
50. See id. at 234-39.
51. 89 U.S.P.Q. 266 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
52. See id. at 267.
Claim 4 read: A method of prospecting for petroliferous deposits
comprising, sinking a number of boreholes in an area under
investigation, sealing off each of said boreholes from the atmosphere
at any desirable depth below the level of atmospheric breathing in
such manner that a known area of the inner surface thereof is made
available for diffusion of subsurface gases into said borehole, reducing
the pressure in said borehole to a value substantially below
atmospheric, measuring the rate of pressure rise per unit area of
surface available for diffusion of subsurface gases into said borehole
for a number of timed intervals, determining the rate of pressure rise
in said borehole at a standard reference pressure from the values
obtained in step (4), and comparing the rates determined in step 5 for
the different boreholes to detect anomalies which are indicative of the
presence of petroliferous deposits.
Id.
53. See id. at 267-68. (1) If all the steps of a method claim are purely
mental in character, the subject matter thereof is not patentable within the
meaning of the patent statutes; (2) if a method claim embodies both positive
and physical steps as well as so-called mental steps, yet the alleged novelty or
advance over the art resides in one or more of the so-called mental steps, then
the claim is considered unpatentable for the same reason that it would be if all
the steps were purely mental in character; and (3) if a method claim embodies
both positive and physical steps as well as so-called mental steps, yet the

44

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 1:33

The court affirmed the Board of Appeals’s rejection of
Abrams’s patent application because the claims were within the
second proposed rule:
Rule 2: If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as
well as so-called mental steps, yet the alleged novelty or advance over
the art resides in one or more of the so-called mental steps, then the
claim is considered unpatentable for the same reason that it would be
54
if all the steps were purely mental in character.

In addition, the court quoted the statement of the examiner
following appeal to the Board that steps such as “correcting,”
“determining,”
“registering,”
“counting,”
“observing,”
“measuring,” “comparing,” “recording,” and “computing” were
55
mental steps.
Later courts would distinguish Abrams’s method, which
could only be performed using mental steps, from methods that
could be performed with or without using mental steps. In In
56
re Prater, Prater claimed a method and apparatus for
determining concentrations of components in a substance by
57
analyzing its spectrograph. The examiner argued that if the
novelty or advance over the art resides in one or more of the positive and
physical steps and the so-called mental step or steps are incidental parts of the
process which are essential to define, qualify, or limit its scope, then the claim
is patentable and not subject to the objections contained in (1) and (2) above.
Id.
54. Id. at 271.
55. Id. at 268.
56. 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
57. Id. at 1380. Claim 17 of the application read:
The method of determining with minimum error from the spectra of
spectral analysis the concentration of the components of a mixture
where the components are known and the concentration-determining
peaks of the spectral analysis are present in number exceeding the
number of said components, which comprises generating physical
representations of the magnitudes of the coefficients of simultaneous
linear equations defining the concentrations of said components as
functions of the heights of said peaks of said spectral analysis,
generating from said physical representations of the magnitudes of
said coefficients the magnitude of the determinant of a plurality of
sets of said simultaneous equations, the number of equations of each
of said sets being equal in number to the number of said components,
comparing said physical representations of the magnitudes of said
determinants of said sets of equations for identification of the set of
said equations whose determinant has the largest magnitude, and
generating physical representations of the concentration of each said
component of said mixture from said physical representations of the
magnitudes of said coefficients of said set of simultaneous equations
having said determinant of largest magnitude and from said heights
of said peaks included in said last names [sic] set of equations.
Id.
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novel part of the process was a mental step and therefore non58
patentable subject matter under the patent statute, then the
59
whole process was unpatentable. Alternatively, the examiner
reasoned that if the claim was a process that could be practiced
by a person marking paper during calculation by hand, the
60
The Board of
claim was unpatentable under section 102.
Appeals affirmed the rejection based on sections 101 and 102,
stating that the process recited a mental exercise and was
61
therefore not a statutory process.
The court analyzed the Board’s rejection under sections
101 and 102 by comparing the claimed invention to the claims
at issue in Abrams. The court reasoned that the critical
distinction between the inventions in Abrams and Prater is that
62
the Abrams process “could only be performed in the mind.”
The Prater invention, however, performed a process without
requiring any steps to be performed in the human mind. The
63
Prater court held that such an invention is patentable. The
court also made clear that it had not adopted the rules
64
proposed by the appellant in Abrams.
The court also analyzed the relevant Supreme Court
decisions regarding the patentability of process claims. The
65
court stated that the holding of Cochrane v. Deener had been
misconstrued to limit processes to operations that manipulate
66
physical things. Rather, the holding was not meant “to limit
process patentability but to point out that a process is not
67
limited to the means used in performing it.”
68
The court said that Tilghman v. Proctor clarified
Cochrane by stating that a process is “an act, or mode of acting”
and “a conception of the mind, seen only by its effects when
69
being executed or performed.”
The court stated that The
58. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1999).
59. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1381 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
60. Id. at 1381.
61. Id. at 1382.
62. Id. at 1389.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1386.
65. 94 U.S. 780 (1876). A process “is an act, or a series of acts, performed
upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or
thing.” Id. at 788.
66. See Prater, 415 F.2d at 1381, 1387.
67. Id. at 1388.
68. 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
69. Id. at 728.
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70

Telephone Cases failed to find any “rule” in Cochrane that
71
required a process to manipulate a physical substance. There
is no such limit on apparati. The court also pointed to the
doctrine that a process that performs a function that occurs
naturally was patentable if the means claimed did not occur in
72
nature.
The court then applied its analysis of Abrams and the
Supreme Court’s rulings to the process in Prater; it held the
process, which read on the human brain, patentable because it
was a useful art, capable of performance without human
intervention; furthermore, its patentability was not precluded
73
The
because it could be performed by mental steps alone.
court said the process could be called a natural process but it
was patentable because the applicant disclosed other means
(other than mental steps as performed by the human brain) by
74
which to conduct the process. The method in Prater could be
performed on a computer. The PTO successfully petitioned for
rehearing because it believed that the decision opened the door
75
for the patentability of computer programs. On rehearing of
76
Prater, the court reversed itself. The court gave the Prater
process claim its broadest reading, stating that because the
process could be done by hand as well as by machine, Prater
failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject
matter that the applicant regards as his invention as required
77
Prater regarded the invention to be the
by section 112.
process performed by the machine, yet the claim could be
interpreted as a process that could be performed on the human
78
brain or by hand with pencil and paper. This fails to claim
particularly what Prater regarded as the invention; namely,
the performance of the process only upon the computer. The
decision of the Prater court on rehearing is profoundly
70. 126 U.S. 1 (1887).
71. 415 F.2d at 1388.
72. For example, chicken eggs are naturally incubated by hens. A process
for artificially incubating chicken eggs is patentable even though it mimics a
natural process. See Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935); Waxham v. Smith, 294
U.S. 20 (1935).
73. 415 F.2d at 1389.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1390. At the time of the Prater decision, the PTO strongly
opposed the patenting of computer programs.
76. Id. at 1393.
77. Id. at 1404.
78. See id. at 1393.
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important because it elevates the protection of society’s freedom
of thought to the same plane of protection as an individual’s
invention for his exclusive benefit. The section 112 rejection
was also appropriate because the inventor had not invented the
79
brain nor the program’s ability to read on the human brain.
80
The mental steps doctrine arose again in In re Musgrave.
Musgrave had invented a method of using seismograms to
precisely measure the subsurface formations in the earth’s
81
crust. The Board of Appeals sustained the examiner’s section
82
101 rejection. The Board applied the Abrams rules and found
that the claimed process contained conventional steps used in
seismic exploration with the addition of mental calculation of
83
corrective data.
84
The court reversed, holding that it had not adopted the
85
Abrams rules, and that rules two and three of Abrams were
illogical because a novelty analysis was irrelevant under
86
section 101. Novelty is a requirement of sections 102 and 103,

79. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
80. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
81. See id. at 882. Claim 2 read:
In seismic exploration, the method of establishing weathering
corrections in the form of individual static time-corrections for the
signals from each of a plurality of seismic detecting stations spaced
one from the other along a traverse which comprises (1) generating at
generating stations seismic signals adjacent selected ones of said
detecting stations whereby the magnitudes of said static corrections
at said selected stations are known, (2) applying said known static
corrections respectively to signals generated at said selected stations,
(3) applying relative to said known corrections interpolated static
corrections to the remaining signals generated at the remaining of
said detecting stations, and thereafter (4) generating at generating
stations further seismic signals at spaced locations along said line, (5)
detecting at the location of a first group of said stations and thereafter
at other locations of other groups of said stations seismic signals, said
locations being selected in reference to the locations of said secondnamed generating stations for the production of an expanding-spread
seismic-section having applied to the signals from each of said
detecting stations said static corrections, and (6) applying dynamic
normal moveout corrections to the signals of each group of said
detectors to correct them for geometrical spreading.
Id. at 886-87.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 887-89.
84. See id. at 893.
85. See id. at 888-89. The Board of Appeals decision came before the
holding in In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
86. See id. at 889.
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87

not section 101. The question is whether a claim is a process
88
as defined by section 100(b). The court did not use the mental
steps doctrine to invalidate the Musgrave claims; it ruled that
the Musgrave process was patentable because it manipulated
89
seismic signals and was therefore a useful technological art.
The fact that some or all of the process could be carried out in
the human mind, or required the person performing the process
to think, a function of the brain, did not preclude
90
patentability. The court thus avoided a rigorous application of
the mental steps doctrine.
The concurring decision in Musgrave sharply criticized the
majority’s avoidance and criticism of the mental steps doctrine.
The concurrence believed the Musgrave holding was too broad
91
because the term “technological arts” was not defined.
Additionally, criticism of the mental steps doctrine was
unnecessary because its application had already been
92
Both the majority
appropriately circumscribed by the court.
and concurring opinion recognized that it is possible to
contribute to the progress of the useful arts through the
93
application of mental calculations.
However, a process that claims only mental processes or
calculations is not patentable subject matter under section 101
because it fails to promote the progress of the useful arts and
94
purports to preempt the use of the human brain. These ideas
underlie the analysis of process claims that seek patents on
computer programs.
D. ALGORITHMS/COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The issue of the patentability of computer programs has
also faced objection on the ground that computer programs may

87. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (1999).
88. See id. at 890.
89. See id. at 893.
90. See id. at 892.
91. Id. at 893-94 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
92. See id. at 895.
93. For history and analysis of the mental steps doctrine, see generally
Katharine P. Ambrose, Comment, The Mental Steps Doctrine, 48 TENN. L.
REV. 903 (1981), and Norman D. McClaskey, The Mental Process Doctrine: Its
Origin, Legal Basis, and Scope, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1148 (1970).
94. See Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 889-90.
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95

include mathematical algorithms. However, not all computer
programs contain algorithms. Moreover, an algorithm is a
descriptive term that is applicable to numerous types of logical
relationships, some of which may exist in nature such as the
96
binary-coded decimal program in Gottschalk v. Benson. But
there are others, which could never exist in nature, such as the
computer programs that control space flight vehicles. A
mathematical algorithm is a procedure for solving a
97
The patentability of mathematical
mathematical problem.
algorithms expressed as computer programs has been rejected
98
by the Supreme Court. If the core component of a computer
program is little more than an expression of a mathematical
algorithm, it is not patentable subject matter because such an
algorithm is an expression of a fundamental scientific principle,
99
similar to a law of nature, and is not an invention.
In 1939, the Supreme Court ruled that a mathematical
100
algorithm was not patentable subject matter.
The Court
stated that “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical
expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific
101
truth may be.”
95. See generally Robert O. Nimtz, Development of The Law of Computer
Software Protection, 61 J. PAT OFF. SOC’Y 3 (1979) (citing 307 articles on the
subject of the legal protection of computer software).
96. 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972); see also infra notes 113-116, 138-152 and
accompanying text.
97. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 585 n.1 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972); see also
Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959,
976 (1986) (stating that algorithms are often, but not always, devised to solve
mathematical problems).
98. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
99. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186; Parker, 437 U.S. at 593.
100. See Mackay Radio and Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94
(1939).
101. Id.; see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188; Parker, 437 U.S. 584, 591; Benson,
409 U.S. at 67; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1947); Howes v. Great Lakes Press Corp., 679 F.2d 1023, 1029 (2nd Cir.
1982); National Lead Co. v. Western Lead Prod. Co., 324 F.2d 539, 541 (9th
Cir. 1963) (citing Davison Chem. Corp. v. Joliet Chems., Inc., 179 F.2d 793,
794-95 (7th Cir. 1950)); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re
Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 763 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 993
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (Baldwin, concurring); In re Johnson, 589 F. 2d. 1070, 1076 n.5
(C.C.P.A. 1978); In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1241 (C.C.P.A. 1977);
Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1037, 1054 (E.D.
La. 1969); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gas Co., 293 F.
Supp. 555, 569 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
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Forty years later, when the Supreme Court decided
Gottschalk v. Benson, it again had before it a method claim
which expressed a means of converting binary numerals into
decimal numerals and decimal numerals into binary
102
numerals.
This process, if carried out by hand and paper, is
not novel and thus could be rejected under section 102 for lack
of novelty. But as a mathematical algorithm, an iterative
routine to be performed on an electronic digital computer, it
raised the question of whether the computer program
performing the conversion is patentable subject matter. Since
the program performed no other function than to express a
mathematic principle in computer program language, the Court
had before it the pure question of the patentability of a
mathematical algorithm, however expressed, regardless of the
means of carrying out the claimed method. The Court’s
response was the same as its response in 1939 in MacKay
103
The mathematical expression of a
Radio & Telegraph Co.
scientific truth, even in a computer program, is not a
104
The Court thus treated this
patentable invention.
mathematical algorithm in accordance with existing judicial
precedent. The Court clearly left open the possibility that a
process could be invented with the aid of the knowledge of a
mathematical principle or other scientific truth or idea in the
form of an algorithm, and which employs the means of an
electronic digital computer, expressed in the form of a computer
program, to carry out the claimed method as patentable subject
matter under section 101 of the Patent Act.
The Supreme Court defined the term “mathematical
algorithm” as a process that merely expresses a mathematical
105
The
principle in the language of a computer program.
terminology “mathematical algorithm” was interpreted by some
commentators as covering all “computer programs” in
106
But, the C.A.F.C., and its predecessor, correctly
general.
107
interpreted Benson in In re Chatfield. The C.A.F.C., agreeing
with Benson, stated: “However, ‘these programs’ refer to the
specific type of claimed program involved in Benson and not to
102. 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
103. 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
104. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
105. See id. at 65.
106. This was the conventional wisdom throughout the 1970s-90s.
e.g., Donald S. Chisum, PATENTS, §§ 1.01, 1.03 (1991).
107. 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976)

See,
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108

computer programs in general.” In In re de Castelet, the court
wrote, “[t]hat ‘computer programs’ are not patentable is not the
109
‘thrust’ of Benson.” In In re Freeman, the court noted, “[t]hat
computer programs are not patentable was neither the holding
110
The Supreme Court revisited
nor the ‘thrust’ of Benson.”
Benson in Diamond v. Diehr, reaffirming its prior holding: “In
Gottschalk v. Benson we noted: ‘It is said that the decision
precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We
111
do not so hold.’” Therefore, the existence of an algorithm in a
computer program does not per se render that computer
program non-patentable subject matter.
E. MATHEMATICAL ALGORITHMS: THE DEBATE GOES ON
The Supreme Court, in Benson, directly addressed the
112
issue of the patentability of mathematical algorithms.
Benson and Tabott sought a patent on a process for converting
113
binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals.

108. Id. at 156 n.4.
109. 562 F.2d at 1240.
110. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
111. 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 71).
112. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
113. A digital computer operates on data expressed in digits. See id. at 65.
There are two forms used to express these digits: binary-coded decimal and
pure binary. See id. A decimal number such as eleven is expressed as two
digits 11. In binary-coded decimal, each digit is converted into a sequence of
four binary digits consisting of 0s or 1s, so that a two-digit decimal number
would be expressed as two sets of four binary digits. See id. at 66. In pure
binary, the decimal number is converted into one sequence of binary digits.
See id. at 66-67.
Claim 8 read:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into
binary which comprises the steps of (1) storing the binary coded
decimal signals in a reentrant shift register, (2) shifting the signals to
the right by at least three places, until there is a binary “1” in the
second position of said register, (3) masking out said binary “1” in said
second position of said register, (4) adding a binary “1” to the first
position of said register, (5) shifting the signals to the left by two
positions, (6) adding a “1” to said first position, and (7) shifting the
signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation for a
succeeding binary “1” in the second position of said register.
See id. at 73-74.
The importance of this process cannot be overstated. It is the way
computer programs operate to convert data into a form that can be understood
and manipulated by computers. Fourteen amicus curiae briefs were filed with
the court.
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The Court defined an algorithm as a procedure for solving a
114
given type of mathematical formula.
Because the claim at
issue was a generalized formula without any specific
application, issuing a patent on such a broad claim would pre115
Although it has been argued that
empt use of the algorithm.
116
there was no apparent rationale for the Court’s holding, a
proper basis for the Court’s decision is found in the fact that the
applicants sought a patent on a computer program that
expressed a mathematical principle. Patents on mathematical
principles alone, however expressed, are not patentable subject
117
Others have argued that the Court’s reasoning is
matter.
118
muddled.
Chisum argues that the decision merely restates
the relevant case law and then holds that algorithms are not
119
This argument is
patentable because they are ideas.
120
contradicted by others
and may have missed the deeper
meaning embodied in the Court’s analysis.
Chisum further argues that there was no reason for the
121
The Court did
Court’s belief that an algorithm is an idea.
recognize that its decision might generate confusion:
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect
that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals
to pure binary numerals were patented in this case. The
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer, which means
that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-

114. See id. at 65.
115. See id. at 72.
116. See, e.g., John M. Griem, Jr., Against a Sui Generis System of
Intellectual Property for Computer Software, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 145 (1993).
But see Charles Bruzga, The Benson Court’s Approach to Computer Software—
or Other—Patent Claims Reciting a Mathematical Algorithm, 74 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 135 (1992). Bruzga argues that Benson was well reasoned and based on
the section 112 overbreadth test, i.e., the claims covered any and every use of
the conversion of binary decimal to pure decimal. See id.
117. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (citing Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S.
86, 94 (1939)).
118. For a detailed attack on the Benson decision, see Donald S. Chisum,
The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959 (1986). Chisum
argues that mathematical algorithms and computer programs should be
patentable. See id. at 971-92. For the opposing view that computer programs
should remain outside the scope of patentable subject matter, see Pamela
Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J.
1025 (1990).
119. See Chisum, supra note 118, at 980.
120. See Samuelson, supra note 118.
121. See Chisum, supra note 118, at 980-84.
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empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a
122
patent on the algorithm itself.

However, this supposedly direct statement of the holding did
little to explain why certain algorithms are unpatentable.
The decision in Benson was correct and must be viewed in
the context of prior case law concerning the patentability of
computer programs. One of the earliest cases that raised the
question of the patentability of computer programs was In re
123
Bernhart. In Bernhart, the applicant sought a patent entitled
124
“Planar Illustration Method and Apparatus.” The application
disclosed a method for making a two-dimensional portrayal of a
three-dimensional object from any angle to any projection (a
125
plotting machine).
The basis of the application involved equations which were
related to the geometric relationship between the three126
dimensional coordinates. The coordinates were to be inputted
127
into a digital computer.
The equations and the computer
function together to produce a view of an object on a piece of
128
paper.
The applicants did not claim to have invented either the
equations or the computer; however, they argued that their
invention was more than just a set of equations or
129
algorithms. The application had been rejected on the grounds
that the applicants would preempt the use of the equations that
were disclosed in the patent application and that the
programmed instructions were part of the method and
130
apparatus.
The Patent Examiner had originally rejected the claim on
the basis that the novelty of the application lay in the
equations that were programmed in the computer, and that,
consequently, the applicants were attempting to patent mental
131
The court disagreed with the examiner’s finding,
steps.
holding that the “the invention as defined by the claims

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
417 F.2d 1395 (1969).
Id. at 1396.
See id. at 1396-98.
See id. at 1396.
See id.
See id. at 1396.
See id.
See id. at 1398-99.
See id. at 1400.
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requires that the information be processed not by the mind but
by a machine,” and that the invention was a statutory
132
The court went on to hold that “if a machine is
process.
programmed in a certain new and unobvious way, it is
133
physically different from the machine without that program.”
In addition, the court held that the use of an equation in a
134
patentable process did not constitute a monopoly.
This was
an important legal development, setting an important
precedent for patents on programs that contained
mathematical equations and algorithms.
Knowledge of
mathematical principles was used to invent a new type of
computer and the algorithm was inoffensive as it did not
merely express a mathematical principle. This development
would later be narrowed by holdings of the United States
135
However, the Court established the
Supreme Court.
principle that patents are not necessarily considered nonstatutory if they contain mathematical components.
In contrast to Bernhart, Benson was one of the first U.S.
136
Supreme Court cases to directly test the limits of section 101.
In Benson, the applicants sought to gain a patent on a process
to convert binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary
137
This conversion process is an essential step in
numerals.
enabling a programmer to communicate with the computer.
The machine’s language is binary; a human’s language is
decimal.
Unlike the plotting machine in Bernhart, this
conversion process was unrelated to any machine or
138
The Court determined that the conversion
apparatus.
process was a mathematical algorithm and that patenting such
a process would be like patenting Newton’s theory of
139
As a result, the Supreme Court held that the
relativity.
140
conversion process could not be patented.
The Court held
that the method was so abstract as to cover both known and
unknown uses of binary-coded decimal to pure binary

132. See id. at 1399.
133. See id. at 1400.
134. See id.
135. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); see also discussion infra
notes 239248.
136. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
137. Id. at 64.
138. See id. at 64.
139. See id. at 71.
140. See id. at 71-73.
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conversion; the end use may vary, such as from the operation of
a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to researching law
books for precedents; the end use may be performed through
141
the
any existing machinery or without any apparatus;
mathematical formula involved has no substantial practical
142
application except in connection with a digital computer; and
the result of granting the patent would be to patent a
mathematical formula, wholly preempting the formula
involved, and in practical effect, patenting the algorithm
143
itself.
The Court reasoned that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a
fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
patented, since no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
144
Benson holds that the mathematical conversion
right.”
process is a phenomena of nature, not an invention as claimed
in the patent application, and is therefore not a process within
145
the meaning of the Patent Act, and hence, is unpatentable.
The determining aspect of the case was that the claims were
not limited to any particular art or technology, apparatus or
146
The applicant’s patent purported to
machinery, or end use.
cover any use of the claimed method in a general purpose
147
A successful patent application
digital computer of any type.
would have resulted in the inability of anyone obtaining a
patent on a computer program to utilize the function of
translation of their program from decimal to binary without
licensing the use of the algorithm from the applicant.
The legal principle that emerges from Benson is that a
scientific truth or mathematical expression of it, without more,
148
It does not matter whether
is not patentable subject matter.
the mathematical expression takes the form of a mathematical
formula or computer program or other type of expression;
standing alone, such an expression is not statutory subject
149
Furthermore, a scientific truth is non-statutory,
matter.
whether expressed as a principle in the abstract, an original
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. at 68.
See id. at 71-72.
See id. at 72.
Id. at 67 (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1852)).
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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cause, a motive, a phenomena of nature, or a mental process.
However, Benson also teaches that a computer program that
applies a law of nature to achieve a new and useful result can
151
be patentable subject matter under the Patent Act.
In In re Freeman, the C.C.P.A. addressed the issue of the
patentability of a method claim that included an algorithm as
152
In Freeman, the claim
an element of the computer program.
153
involved a method for controlling a computer display screen.
The PTO Board of Appeals rejected the method claims, holding
that the only novelty of the method was in a computer program
limited to use on a computer, and such a claim, under Benson,
is unpatentable because it constitutes a mathematical
154
The court strongly criticized the Board for two
algorithm.
155
reasons: first, it improperly used a novelty test; and second,
the Board made a blanket statement that Freeman’s claim
preempted a mathematical algorithm without analyzing the
156
claim language.
The Freeman claims recited a system and method for
typesetting alphanumeric information using a computer-based
control system with a phototypesetter; the claims did not recite
157
The court
or expressly purport to preempt an algorithm.
created a two-part test for analyzing whether a claim
preempted an algorithm:
First, it must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly
recites an “algorithm” in the Benson sense of that term, for a claim
which fails even to recite an algorithm clearly cannot wholly preempt
an algorithm. Second, the claim must be further analyzed to
158
ascertain whether in its entirety it wholly preempts that algorithm.

The court emphasized that the Supreme Court’s narrow
definition of an unpatentable algorithm is limited primarily to

150. See id.
151. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1999).
152. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
153. Id. at 1238.
154. See id. at 1242.
155. See id. at 1243. The Board had held that the only point of novelty of
the claim was a mathematical algorithm, and since that point of novelty was
non-statutory subject matter, the claim was invalid. See id. The court held
that this was the wrong analysis. See id. The claim must be analyzed as a
whole, not just at its point of novelty, to determine whether it is within
statutory subject matter. See id.
156. See id. at 1245.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1246.
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159

mathematical algorithms.
If a broad definition of an
algorithm (the step-by-step procedure for solving a problem or
accomplishing some end) were adopted, then, under Benson, all
160
The court found that
processes would be unpatentable.
Freeman’s claim did not recite a mathematical algorithm
because the claims did not recite any mathematical
161
calculations, formulae, or equations.
To avoid the use of the term “algorithm” alone, without the
modifying adjective “mathematical,” the Supreme Court in
Benson carefully supplied a definition for “mathematical
algorithm”: “A procedure for solving a given type of
162
mathematical problem.” This definition was later affirmed by
the court in Flook: “We use the word ‘algorithm’ in this case as
163
we did in Gottschalk v. Benson”; and in Diamond v. Diehr:
“Our previous decisions regarding the patentability of
‘algorithms’ are necessarily limited to the more narrow
definition employed by the Court, and we do not pass judgment
on whether processes [or algorithms] falling outside the
definition previously used by this Court . . . would be
164
patentable subject matter.” In Walter, the C.C.P.A. employed
the same definition as above:
[W]e use the word algorithm . . . to refer to methods of calculation,
mathematical formulas, and mathematical procedures generally. We
strongly disagree with the position taken by the PTO . . . that the
word algorithm as applied by the Supreme Court in § 101 cases is not
limited to mathematical algorithms, but extends to the general
meaning of the word which connotes a step-by-step procedure to
arrive at a given result. Such a proposition, if accepted, would have
the effect of totally reading the word “process” out of § 101, since any
165
process is a step-by-step procedure to arrive at a given result.

Thus, the C.C.P.A. correctly distinguishes mathematical
algorithms which are non-patentable from other algorithms
which may be patentable, if articulated in a computer program.
Walter claimed as his invention a seismic prospecting
system and method for cross-correlating returning chirp signals
with an original chirp signal; thus, the claims recite cross-

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 n.1 (1978).
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 n.9 (1991).
In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 765 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (citation omitted).
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166

correlation algorithms.
Walter expanded the Freeman two-part test to give
guidance to the PTO, the bar, industry, and the general
167
public.
The analytical steps were as follows: (1) Does the
claim directly or indirectly recite an algorithm? and (2) is the
algorithm implemented in a specific manner that enables one to
define a structural relationship between the physical elements
168
of the claim or to otherwise define or limit the claim steps?
In In re Abele this two-step test was visited and refined by
169
the C.C.P.A., and its second step was sharpened.
The
C.C.P.A. stated that:
[The] Walter analysis . . . does not limit patentable subject matter
only to claims in which structural relationships or process steps are
defined, limited or refined by the application of the algorithm. . . .
Rather, Walter should be read as requiring no more than that the
algorithm be “applied in any manner to physical elements or process
steps,” provided that its application is circumscribed by more than a
field of use limitation or non-essential post-solution activity. Thus, if
the claim would be “otherwise statutory,” albeit inoperative or less
useful without the algorithm, the claim likewise presents statutory
170
subject matter when the algorithm is included.

In effect, the refined test amounts to the following steps: (1) it
must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly
171
recites a “mathematical algorithm” or “formula”; and (2) if the
claim without the mathematical algorithm or formula is
statutory subject matter (i.e., an apparatus or process), then
172
the whole claim still may present statutory subject matter.
The C.C.P.A. in Abele purportedly applied the test of the
two conflicting cases decided by the Supreme Court, Parker v.
173
174
Flook and Diamond v. Diehr. According to the court,
166. See id. at 760-61.
167. Id. at 767.
168. See Walter, 618 F.2d. at 767. The invention involved a topographic
scanner or CAT scan imaging technique, using a weighting function in
calculations to produce an image with artifacts eliminated. See id. at 760-61.
The court determined that the method claim for displaying data was nonstatutory because it was directed solely to the algorithm. See id. at 770. The
court stated, however, that the method and apparatus claims directed to the
high frequency attenuation data could be statutory, if limited to a unitary
device. See id. at 768-69.
169. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
170. Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
171. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
172. See Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.
173. 473 U.S. 584 (1978). The case involved:
A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at
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In Flook, supra, “[t]he patent application did not ‘explain how to
select . . . any of the variables’ used in the algorithm and, thus, no
process other than the algorithm was present.” (citation omitted). A
fortiori, no process steps to which the algorithm could be applied were
175
present.
176

Regarding Diehr, the C.C.P.A. stated that “were the claim to
be read without the algorithm, the process would still be a
process for curing rubber, although it might not work as well
177
since the in-mold time would not be as accurately controlled.”
The Freeman-Walter-Abele test is the direct result of the
court’s refusal to deny patents in three cases even though the
least one process variable involved in a process comprising the
catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm
limit has a current value of B0 + K, wherein B0 is the current alarm
base and K is a predetermined alarm offset which comprises: (1)
determining the present value of said process variable, said present
value being defined as PVL; (2) determining a new alarm base B 1
using the following equation: B1=B0(1.0-F)+PVL(F), where F is a
predetermined number greater than zero and less than 1.0; (3)
adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.
Id. at 596-97.
174. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
175. Abele, 684 F.2d at 908.
176. The claim was:
A method of manufacturing precision molded articles from selected
synthetic rubber compounds in an openable rubber molding press
having at least one heated precision mold, comprising: (a) heating
said mold to temperature range approximating pre-determined
rubber curing temperature, (b) installing prepared unmolded
synthetic rubber of a known compound in a molding cavity of a
predetermined geometry as defined by said mold, (c) closing said
press to mold said rubber to occupy said cavity in conformance with
the contour of said mold and to cure said rubber by transfer of heat
thereto from said mold, (d) initiating an interval timer upon the
closure of said press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure,
(e) heating said mold. . ., (f) constantly determining the temperature
of said mold. . ., (g) repetitively calculating at frequent periodic
intervals throughout closure of said press the Arrhenius equation for
reaction time of said rubber to determine total cure time v as follows:
Ln v=cz+x wherein c is an activation energy constant determined for
said rubber being molded and cured in said press, z is the
temperature of said mold at the time of each calculation of said
Arrhenius equation, and x is a constant which is a function of said
predetermined geometry of said mold, (h) for each repetition of
calculation of said Arrhenius equation herein, comparing the
resultant calculated total required cure time with the monitored
elapsed time measured by said interval timer, (i) opening said press
when a said comparison of calculated total required cure time and
monitored elapsed time indicates equivalence, and (j) removing from
said mold the resultant precision molded and cured rubber article.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 1780 n.5.
177. Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.
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inventions applied a mathematical algorithm to an otherwise
178
statutory apparatus or process.
The test further articulated
an important aspect of the holdings in the Benson/Flook
179
In both Benson and Flook, the court
algorithm rejections.
rejected programs having mathematical algorithms, but both
cases left open the possibility that an invention that applied the
knowledge of a mathematical algorithm in a new and useful
180
way might be statutory subject matter. The Freeman-WalterAbele test may be used to determine whether an invention only
expresses a mathematical algorithm, or whether the algorithm
181
Thus, the Freeman-Walterprimarily informs the invention.
Abele test was an important advance in the maturation of
patent law.
An algorithm may be defined as a “step-by-step procedure
182
Accepting
for solving a problem or accomplishing some end.”
this definition, it could be argued that every process contains
183
Since the Patent Act states that process
an algorithm.
patents are statutory subject matter, it follows that a complete
bar against inventions that contain algorithms would violate
184
However, the bar against inventions that
the Patent Act.
contain only mathematical algorithms was appropriate as these
inventions were mere expressions of mathematical principles.
To grant a patent on such computer programs would be
tantamount to granting a monopoly on the tools of the trade for
programming an electronic digital computer. Such a decision
would not promote the advancement of science, for such
supposed invention was in fact a discovery of a law of nature,
which is the same mathematical law that makes the computer
work and must be utilized by all computer programs. To grant
a monopoly on these principles would strangle innovation in
the computer sciences.
In In re Grams, the applicant sought a patent on a method

178. See id.; In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573
F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A 1978).
179. See sources cited supra note 178.
180. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63 (1972).
181. See Abele, 684 F.2d 902; Walter, 618 F.2d 758; Freeman, 573 F.2d
1237.
182. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 156 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (quoting WEBSTER’S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1976)).
183. 958 F.2d 1053, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, R. concurring.)
184. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1999).
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185

of diagnosing an abnormal condition in an individual.
This
diagnosis was done by gathering data about an individual
through laboratory tests, analyzing the data to determine
whether there was any indication of the abnormality, and then
comparing that data with predetermined data for what the
186
The
normal conditions should be in an individual.
application required that a computer be used to filter the data
and focus on the areas responsible for the abnormal
187
condition.
The court applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele test and found
188
that the claims contained an algorithm. The court went on to
determine that the only physical aspect of the process was
obtaining data to input into the algorithm, and that the
gathering was not sufficient for the process to be found
189
statutory.
The Grams court applied another touch to the two-step
test: introducing necessary steps for “data gathering” would not
190
The court held that:
save an otherwise non-statutory claim.
“[N]otwithstanding that the antecedent steps are novel and
unobvious, they merely determine values for the variables used
in the mathematical formulae used in making the
calculations. . . . [They] do not suffice to render the claimed
191
methods, considered as a whole, statutory subject matter.”
This definition of “algorithm” has been commonly referred to as
192
“algorithm in the Benson sense.”
As stated above, the broader definition of algorithm is “a
step-by-step procedure for solving a problem or accomplishing
193
The C.C.P.A. has emphasized the distinction
some end.”
between “algorithm in the Benson sense,” as defined above, and
“algorithm” in general: “It is axiomatic that inventive minds
185. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
186. See id. at 836-37.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 837.
189. See id. at 839-40.
190. Id. This was based on the precedent cases. See In re Meyer, 688 F.2d
789 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re
Richman, 563 F.2d. 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
191. Richman, 563 F.2d at 1030.
192. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
193. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 156 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (quoting WEBSTER’S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1976)); see also 985 F.2d 1053, 1063 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Rader, R. concurring).
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seek and develop solutions to problems and step-by-step
solutions often attain the status of patentable invention. It
would be unnecessarily detrimental to our patent system to
deny inventors patent protection on the sole ground that their
194
contribution could be broadly termed an ‘algorithm.’”
In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Merrill Lynch, the
court distinguished between two distinct uses of the term
“algorithm”:
In mathematics, the word algorithm has attained the meaning of
recursive computational procedure and appears in notational
language, defining a computational course of events which is itself
2
2
2
contained, for example A +B =C . In contrast, the computer algorithm
is a procedure consisting of operation to combine data, mathematical
principles and equipment for the purpose of interpreting and/or acting
upon a certain data input. In comparison to the mathematical
algorithm, which is self contained, the computer algorithm must be
applied to the solution of a specific problem. . . . The PTO, in the past,
has had the tendency to hold that a computer program, which is
expressed in numerical expression, is not statutory subject matter
and thus unpatentable because the computer program is inherently
195
an algorithm.

In In re Iwahashi, the court “note[d] these discussions of
the meaning of ‘algorithm’ to take the mystery out of the
term. . . . [I]t follows that it is no ground for holding a claim is
directed to nonstatutory subject matter to say it includes or is
196
directed to an algorithm.”
In Arryhthmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix
Corp., the applicants sought a patent on a method to analyze
the electrocardiographic signals in order to determine heart
197
The purpose of the invention was to determine
functions.
194. Id. at 156 n.5.
195. 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1366-67 (D. Del. 1983); accord In re Pardo, 684
F.2d 214 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Philips, 608 F.2d 879 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re
Toma, 575 F.2d 872, (C.C.P.A. 1978). The court also noted that “[t]he
C.C.P.A., however, has reversed the findings of the PTO and held that a
computer algorithm, as opposed to a mathematical algorithm [expressed as a
computer program], is patentable subject matter.” 564 F. Supp. at 1367.
196. 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
197. 958 F.2d 1053, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The claimed statutory subject
matter in Arryhthmia involved a method and apparatus for gathering and
analyzing electrocardiographic signals to determine the presence or absence of
certain heart function characteristics. Id. These input signals, related to a
patient’s heart signals, were found not to be abstractions. Id. at 1059. The
court further found that the claimed steps of “converting,” “applying,”
“determining,” and “comparing” were physical steps that transformed one
physical, electrical signal into another. Id. The court determined that the
claims comprised an otherwise statutory process whose mathematical
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which heart attack victims were at risk for a condition called
“ventricular tachycardia” which leads to ventricular
198
fibrillation. Ventricular fibrillation is a condition that causes
199
the heart to stop pumping blood throughout the body.
An
individual is particularly susceptible to ventricular fibrillation
200
in the first few hours after suffering a heart attack. Although
the ventricular fibrillation is treatable, the drugs used to treat
201
The purpose of the
it can have dangerous side effects.
invention was to prevent the patient from having to suffer from
the fibrillation and to prevent unnecessary risks involved with
202
the treatment.
This was to be accomplished by a process that would
203
monitor an individual’s electrocardiographic signals.
The
invention proposed that this be done by monitoring an
individual’s electrical heart signals with an electrocardiograph
204
device. A physician would then interpret the signals given off
by the patient’s heart to determine whether he was at risk for
205
ventricular tachycardia.
The analysis would require converting data from analog to
digital, filtering data, computing value, and comparing to
206
The predetermined data consisted of
predetermined data.
data of frequency energy a heart should give off: “That is, if the
procedures were applied to physical process steps. Id.
In comparing Grams and Arrhythmia, both inventions involved a method
of diagnosing abnormal medical conditions in patients. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d
at 1054; Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Both utilized datagathering steps and numerical processing of that data using a computer to
determine the normality of the patient’s condition. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at
1055; Grams, 888 F.2d at 836-37, 840. Further, both methods provided useful
information to doctors. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 459; Grams, 888 F.2d at 836.
In Arrhythmia and Grams, the Federal Circuit applied the Freeman-WalterAbele test. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058-59; Grams, 888 F.2d at 837 n.1, 83840. In Arrhythmia, the court determined that the data-gathering step was not
irrelevant; the court recognized that changing one electrical signal into
another is physical. 958 F.2d at 1059. In Grams, the court found that
performing clinical tests on patients, the only physical step, is an irrelevant
step. 888 F.2d at 840.
198. See Ahrrythmia, 958 F.2d at 1054.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 1055.
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root mean square magnitude is less than the predetermined
207
level,” then there is a higher risk of ventricular tachycardia.
The lower court held that the method and apparatus
claims of the patent were largely reliant on a mathematical
algorithm, and therefore not statutory subject matter under
section 101 of the Patent Act, after the PTO had granted the
208
patent without question.
The Federal Circuit found that the patent was statutory
209
subject matter under section 101.
The Court applied the
210
Freeman-Walter-Abele test
and determined that a
mathematical algorithm was involved in the patent, and thus
proceeded to the second stage of the test, which was to decide
211
The
whether or not the rest of the patent was statutory.
court found that the “steps of ‘converting,’ ‘applying,’
‘determining’ and ‘comparing’ are physical process steps that
212
transform one physical, electrical signal into another.”
Hence, the court found that the Freeman-Walter-Abele standard
had been met because the “mathematical procedures are
213
How does this court
applied to physical process steps.”
distinguish this language from every other computer program,
including Gottschalk v. Benson? The only way this can be
justified is an approval of a patent on a business method.
The facts in Arrhythmia are analogous to those in Diehr in
214
that they “do not seek to patent a mathematical formula,” but
rather to “foreclose from others the use of that equation in
215
conjunction with all the other steps in their claimed process.”
Moreover, the Arrhythmia court found that the transformation
of the electrocardiographic signals of an individual’s heartbeat
by a machine utilizing several mathematical formulas was “a
practical application of an abstract idea, . . . because it
corresponded to a useful, concrete or tangible thing – the
216
condition of a patient’s heart.”
Arrhythmia set the precedent that, in accessing the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 178-181.
See Arryhthmia, 958 F.2d at 1060.
Id. at 1059.
Id.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Id. at 187.
Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1054.
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patentability of a process, the focus should be on whether the
invention is useful and produces a tangible result; thus, the
focus shifted from determining the manner in which a process
217
In this
reached a result to whether its result was tangible.
case, the waves that were produced on a screen represented the
tangible condition of a patient’s heart, making the case for the
218
patenting of computer programs more viable.
The applicants in In re Alappat sought a patent on an
invention that involved a way to generate smooth waveform on
219
The front of a cathode-ray tube
the screen of an oscilloscope.
(CRT) is made up of an array or raster of pixels arranged in
220
The pixels are
vertical columns and horizontal rows.
221
illuminated and produce an image on the screen. Prior to the
invention proposed in Alappat, the screen would appear jagged
222
The invention made the waves appear more
and oscillated.
223
smooth and continuous.
This was accomplished by calculating the different
224
intensities for the pixels on the display. In effect, the display
produced numerical representations without generating or
displaying the waveform. The patent was drafted as an
apparatus claim and was almost purely mathematical. In
effect, the patent was for an apparatus that could perform
225
mathematical functions.
The court held that the patent application involved
226
statutory subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act
227
228
as a machine.
The application was for a “rasterizer.”
Although it was not necessary, the court went on to determine
whether the machine should be barred by the mathematical
229
algorithm exception.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
See id.
33 F.3d 1526, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1999).
See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545.
See id.
See id. at 1544.

66

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 1:33

The court found that mathematical algorithms are not an
excluded category; rather, only some mathematical related
patents are excluded, such as those that “standing alone,
represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to
230
some type of practical application.”
The court then went on to apply the Claims-as-a-Whole
231
test.
This was done to determine whether the claim in
Alappat was directed to a mathematical algorithm, which
would make it unpatentable subject matter. Applying this test,
the court found that the claim was for a “specific machine to
232
produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”
In Benson,
the rationale for denying the applicants’ patent on the
mathematical algorithm was not to prevent everyone from
using the mathematical algorithm but to prevent anyone from
having a monopoly on the mathematical algorithm and thereby
to ensure that everyone can use the mathematical algorithm in
any application for a new patent on a computer program and as
long as the application does not preempt the use of the
mathematical algorithm by anyone else. Therefore, every use
of a mathematical algorithm in its section 112 disclosure must
deny that they, the applicant, has invented the mathematical
algorithm as an element of his claimed invention, yet the
applicant may properly claim, as this court held, that he has
used a mathematical algorithm in his processor apparatus.
The analysis that the court performed in Alappat was
similar to that in Arrhythmia, and further reiterated the fact
that the question of whether a patent is proper statutory
subject matter should focus on whether the patent produces a
tangible result and not on whether it contains a mathematical
233
The court in Alappat went so far as to say that
algorithm.
the holding made an even better case for the patenting of
234
The court never intended
computer-related process patents.
to create an overly broad fourth category of mathematical
subject matter excluded from section 101; rather, at the core of
the analysis lies an attempt by the court to explain a rather
straightforward concept: that certain types of mathematical
230. Id. at 1543.
231. See id.; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that
patents that contain algorithms must be looked at as a whole rather than
being patently rejected).
232. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
233. Id. at 1544.
234. Id. at 1545.
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subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than
abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical
application and that this subject matter is not, in and of itself,
235
entitled to patent protection.
The court made clear that the existence of a mathematical
algorithm as part of a patent does not make the patent nonstatutory subject matter; rather, one simply cannot obtain a
236
patent for a freestanding mathematical algorithm.
In Arrhythmia, the test was actually labeled as FreemanWalter-Abele and it was characterized as:
The law crystallized about the principle that claims directed solely to
an abstract mathematical formula or equation, . . . whether directly or
indirectly stated, are nonstatutory under section 101. . . . However,
when the mathematical algorithm is applied in one or more steps of
an otherwise statutory process claim, or one or more elements of an
otherwise statutory apparatus claim, the requirements of section 101
are met . . . [p]rovided that its [mathematical algorithm] application
is circumvented by more than field of use limitation or non-essential
237
post-solution activity.
238

Arrythmia
echoes Diamond v. Diehr in which the
applicant applied for a patent on a process for molding raw,
239
The
uncured synthetic rubber into cured molded projects.
process utilized a well-known mathematical equation and a

235. See id. at 1526.
236. See id.
237. Arryhthmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053,
1057-58 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
238. Id.
239. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). The claimed invention involved a process for
molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured molded products by
constantly monitoring the temperature of the mold and opening the mold
automatically when cure time indicated curing completion. See id. at 177, 179.
The Court determined that claims must be considered as a whole; it is
inappropriate to dissect claims into old and new elements and then ignore the
presence of old elements. See id. at 188. Statutory subject matter exists when
a claim containing a formula implements or applies that formula in a
structure or process that, when considered as a whole, is performing a function
that patent laws were designed to protect. See id. at 192.
As a side note, the inventions in Diehr and Flook are analogous, even
though the former was upheld and the latter was not. See id. at 192-93;
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978). Both inventions repetitively
calculated updated numbers (new alarm limits and new cure times). See
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 178; Flook, 437 U.S. at 585-86. Both utilized field of use
restrictions (catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons and curing rubber). See
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177; Flook, 437 U.S. at 586. Both involved post-solution
activity (changing the alarm limit and opening the mold). See Diehr, 450 U.S.
at 179; Flook, 437 U.S. at 586.
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240

computer to calculate time.
The process allowed for constant
monitoring of the temperature of the rubber mold and
241
calculation of the proper cure time from the temperature.
The mold would then automatically open when the rubber was
242
properly cured.
The process involved a mathematical
equation and used a computer to calculate when the mold was
243
properly cured. Despite the use of a mathematical algorithm,
the Court, in a split decision, held that the claim was statutory
244
subject matter under section 101.
245
With the decision in Diehr, the tide against patenting of
computer programs receded. The holding discredits the
argument that patents containing mathematical algorithms are
246
In addition, the holding shows that the
per se unpatentable.
Benson and Flook holdings are limited to those claims involving
247
unapplied mathematical algorithms and laws of nature.
The
Court held that “claims must be considered as a whole,”
meaning that a patent could not be rejected solely on the basis
248
of citing a mathematical algorithm.
Most importantly, the court held that “a claim drawn to
subject matter otherwise statutory does not become
nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula,
249
This holding
computer program, or digital computer.”
completely derails the notion that no computer programs can be
patented and asserts that computer programs are patentable
subject matter as a general proposition of law.
In light of the Benson decision and its broad prescription
that a claim employing mathematical algorithms is patentable
subject matter if it does not preempt a mathematical algorithm
250
as a whole, the C.C.P.A., in In re Freeman, tried to clarify the
issue by introducing a two-step procedure in the analysis of the
claim:
First, it must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See id. at 177-78.
See id. at 178.
See id. at 179.
See id. at 178.
See id. at 192-93.
450 U.S. 175.
See id. at 187, 191.
See id. at 188, 191.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 187.
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
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recites an “algorithm” in the Benson sense of that term, for a claim
which fails even to recite an algorithm clearly cannot wholly preempt
an algorithm. Second, the claim must be further analyzed to
251
ascertain whether in its entirety it wholly preempts that algorithm.

The second step of this test was not applicable to the claims in
252
253
254
Freeman.
Later, following Flook and Diehr, the C.C.P.A.
elaborated on the second step of this test in In re Walter:
Flook does not require literal preemption of a mathematical algorithm
by a claim for a finding that the claim is nonstatutory, we thus deem
it appropriate to restate the second step of the Freeman test in terms
other than preemption. Once a mathematical algorithm has been
found, the claim as a whole must be further analyzed. If it appears
that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner
to define structural relationships between the physical elements of
the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in
process claims), the claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes
muster under § 101. If, however, the mathematical algorithm is
merely presented and solved by the claimed invention, as the case in
Benson and Flook, and is not applied in any manner to physical
elements or process steps, no amount of postsolution activity will
render the claim statutory; nor is it saved by a preamble merely
255
reciting the field of use of the mathematical algorithm.

It is noted that the C.C.P.A. actually based its modification
of the test on the holding in Diehr, where the Court said that:
A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our
patent laws, Gottschalk v. Benson, and this principle cannot be
circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a
particular technological environment. Similarly, insignificant post
solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a
256
patentable process.

The two prescriptions given by the Supreme Court and the
C.C.P.A. were not in full harmony, for while the Supreme Court
257
characterized the post-solution activity as “insignificant,” the
C.C.P.A. went to the extreme and characterized it as of “no
258
amount,” which in reality foreclosed any application of the
mathematical formula. It appears that the Supreme Court in
Diehr had already asked for the right amount of post-solution
activity by stating that:

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
See id.
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
618 F.2d 758, 759 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (emphasis added).
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 191.
Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
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A mathematical formula in the abstract is nonstatutory subject
matter regardless of whether the patent is intended to cover all uses
of the formula or only limited uses. Similarly, a mathematical
formula does not become patentable subject matter merely by
including in the claim for the formula token postsolution activity such
259
as the type claimed in Flook.
260

261

However, in its decisions in State Street Bank and AT&T,
the C.A.F.C. decisions achieve complete harmony with the
262
263
holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Diehr and Flook.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CREATION OF
STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER

In State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group,
the Federal Circuit further narrowed the holdings barring
264
patents for computer applications containing algorithms. The
patent at issue involved a system for managing financial
265
The applicants called their invention a machine,
portfolios.
which made it statutory subject matter; however, the fact that
266
the machine utilized algorithms called for further analysis.
The district court had concluded that the patent fell into
one of two exceptions to statutory subject matter: the
259. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192, n.14 (emphasis added).
260. State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
261. AT&T, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
262. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
263. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
264. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The claimed invention involved a data
processing system, where mutual funds (spokes) pooled assets in an
investment portfolio (hub) that was organized as a partnership. See id. at
1368. During the patent prosecution, the examiner contemplated a rejection of
all six method claims. See id at 1371.
The Federal Circuit determined that the district court erred by applying
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to determine whether subject matter claimed
was an unpatentable abstract idea. See id. at 1373. The court stated that the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, applicability to determining the
presence of statutory subject matter. See id. at 1374. The test was misleading
because a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter employing
an abstract idea is patentable subject matter even though the abstract idea
would not, by itself, be entitled to such protection. See id. The court held that
the transformation of data (discrete dollar amounts) by a machine through
series of calculations into a final share price constituted a practical application
of an algorithm because it produced a useful, concrete, and tangible result.
See id. at 1373.
265. See id. at 1370.
266. See id. at 1372.
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“mathematical algorithm” exception or the “business method”
267
exception.
The district court had applied the FreemanWalter-Abele test and determined that the subject matter was
268
The Federal
unpatentable because it was an abstract idea.
Circuit held that “[a]fter Diehr and Chakrabarty, the FreemanWalter-Abele test has little, if any, applicability to determining
269
the presence of statutory subject matter.”
According to the court in State Street Bank, when
determining whether the subject matter is statutory one should
270
look at Diehr’s holding that the three areas of unpatentable
subject matter are “a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or
271
abstract idea.”
In addition to pointing out what the source of exceptions
should be for patentable inventions, the court held that the
focus of whether a claim is statutory subject matter should not
be on which of the four claims it fell under—process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter—but rather “on the
essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular its
272
practical utility.”
This holding has significant advantages for computer
program and software patents. The applicants would no longer
have to prove that their inventions were process patents or
compositions of matter, but rather that their inventions have
practical application, which is indeed a much easier standard to
prove. Moreover, this case discarded the “business method”
273
and reassessed the “mathematical algorithm”
exception
274
exception.
The patent in dispute in AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications Marketing, Inc. was a “Call Message
275
Recording for Telephone Systems.” The system consisted of a
267. See id. at 1372.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 1374.
270. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). Diehr also held that mathematical algorithms
were nothing more than abstract ideas and thus not patentable subject
matter. Id.
271. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1374.
272. Id. at 1375.
273. See id. at 1375 (“We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived
exception to rest.”).
274. See id. at 1375-77.
275. 172 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The test for statutory subject
matter is whether the algorithm is applied in a practical manner to produce a
useful result. See id. at 1360. The invention involved a process employing
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message recording system for long-distance calls that was
enhanced by adding primary interexchange carrier (PIC)
276
The PIC aids in providing differential billing
indicator.
treatment for subscribers depending on whether or not callers
277
The District Court of
carry the same long-distance company.
Delaware had determined that the patent was invalid under
section 101 of the Patent Act for failing to state statutory
278
subject matter.
The district court held that the method of claims recited a
279
mathematical algorithm.
The court reasoned that the one
physical step in the claim involved gathering data for the
280
algorithm and was therefore not statutory subject matter.
The court reasoned that, although the claim utilized switches
and computers, these mechanisms performed “a non281
substantive change in the data’s format” and such “could not
serve to convert non-patentable subject matter into patentable
282
subject matter.”
The Federal Circuit held that the invention was a method
283
claim and was a process patent under section 101.
The court
noted that “[s]ince the process of manipulation of numbers is a
fundamental part of computer technology, [the courts] have had
to reexamine the rules that govern the patentability of such
284
The court recognized the need to reassess the
technology.”
legal boundaries placed upon computer technology in light of
the advances that are being made and the proprietary
protection needed as a result. The court cited these “seachanges in both law and technology . . . as a testament to the

subscribers’ and call recipients’ PIC (primary interexchange carrier) indicator
as data. See id. at 1358. The process applied Boolean algebra to the data to
determine the value of the PIC indicator, and then applied that value through
switching and recording mechanisms to create a useful signal for billing
purposes. See id. at 1358. The claimed process applied the Boolean principle
to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result—i.e., calling a recipient’s PIC
that facilitates differential billing on long-distance calls made by a longdistance service carrier’s subscriber. See id. at 1358.
276. See id. at 1353.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 1355.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 1355.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See id. at 1355-56.
284. Id. at 1356.
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285

ability of law to adapt to new and innovative concepts.”
Indeed, one reason that individuals and corporations seek
286
patents is for fiduciary protection. Today these groups obtain
patents on computer related technology with virtually no
287
As a result, more patent infringement cases are
obstacles.
arising, and these cases are the primary way in which
288
computer related patents are being challenged.
IV. NONOBVIOUSNESS
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not disturb the
C.C.P.A.’s reasoning on the section 101 issue when it reviewed
289
Dann v. Johnston.
Nevertheless, the Court reversed the
290
C.C.P.A.’s decision based on a finding of obviousness.
The
Court was guided by the factors it had set forth in Graham v.
291
John Deere Co. In Graham, the Supreme Court had held that
the central factors relevant to any inquiry into obviousness are
“the scope and content of the prior art,” the “differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue,” and “the level of
292
The Court noted that,
ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”
while it had said in Graham that “secondary considerations
[such] as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
[and] failure of others” might be relevant in determining
293
obviousness, none of those considerations offered substantial
294
support for the claims of nonobviousness.
The obviousness factor may continue to be a major
stumbling block to program patentability.
Although the
Supreme Court in Johnston found no basis for applying
Graham’s secondary indicia of nonobviousness (others having

285. Id.
286. See, e.g., John P. Sumner & Stephen W. Lundberg, Software Patents:
Are They Here to Stay?, 8 No. 10 COMPUTER LAW. 8 (1991) (discussing reasons
for obtaining patent protection).
287. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S., 148 F.3d 1384, 1385 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
288. See Denise Sherman, North Carolina Court Expertise Attractive to
Patent Litigators, TRIANGLE BUS. J., July 23, 1999.
289. 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976).
290. See id. at 230.
291. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
292. Id. at 17.
293. Id.
294. See Johnston, 425 U.S. at 230 n.4.
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attempted and failed to accomplish the same result), it did
296
not reject that test.
Many software inventors will probably
need to rely on such circumstantial evidence:
In the context of computer programming, the use of circumstantial
indicia of nonobviousness may be crucial in some instances. When
presented with the esoteric technology present in the computer
software industry, the factual distinctions produced by the Graham
analysis do not necessarily lend themselves to a clear resolution of the
nonobviousness issue. In practice, the only way for courts to
meaningfully resolve the section 103 issue may be to place increased
297
emphasis on the probative value of circumstantial evidence. . . .

If it were recognized that the purpose of the patent system
is the promotion of the “useful arts,” it would be clear that the
question of whether a process is statutory should be determined
largely in light of its actual contribution to technological
progress. In other words, inventions that in fact promote the
useful arts should not be discriminated against by courtcreated barriers to patentability. This type of discrimination
would be eliminated by a pure application of the “technological
arts” doctrine, unaffected by the fact that a claimed process
might contain mental steps. The “technological arts” doctrine
clearly encompasses computer programs because a program is a
process that is useful in the internal operation of a computer
and, as such, within the useful or technological arts.
Resolution of the question of software patentability is

295. Id. at 226, 228.
296. See id. at 226. A sign that the courts may favorably use the Graham
secondary criteria can be found in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Reeve’s
Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1971).
The court stated that “[w]hen the evidence shows that several others in the art
have attempted to solve the same problem and have not arrived at the solution
claimed by the patent in suit, the statutory presumption of validity is
substantially strengthened.” Id. at 272. Noting earlier industry attempts and
failures, the court held that the plaintiff’s patented method for checking an
analog computer was not obvious in light of the prior art. See id. at 272-73.
297. Gene Commander, Comment, Patentability of Computer Software: The
Nonobviousness Issue, 62 IOWA L. REV. 615, 630 (1976). Reliance on the
Graham criteria may be the “best way to achieve a rational disposition of the
unique legal problems presented by the highly sophisticated computer
industry and at the same time to maintain the constitutional objectives
effectuated by the Patent Act.” Id. at 635.
Interestingly, no question relating to obviousness was ever raised in Benson,
despite the fact that “often when a programmer may wish to convey data from
one format to the other . . . he will devise a series of instructions which are the
logical equivalent of the set which Benson tried to patent.”
Pauline
Wittenberg, Note, Computer Software: Beyond the Limits of Existing
Proprietary Protection Policy, 40 BROOK. L. REV. 116, 135-36 (1973).

2000] PATENT PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS

75

unlikely to come without congressional action.
Even if
Congress does not address the issue in the context outlined in
this article, it is likely to at least consider proposals for an
alternative form of protection for the unique and complex
technology of computer software. Congress is constitutionally
authorized to promote the useful arts by extending protection
298
to inventors and their discoveries, but it is not limited to
traditional patent protection in doing so.
CONCLUSION
The need for proprietary protection of software products is
obvious from the competitive nature of the industry and the
growing number of articles and decisions published on the
subject. As with any new technological advance, however,
judicial and legislative bodies are slow in adapting the law to
meet the needs of these advances. Nevertheless, on both state
and federal levels, software manufacturers are increasingly
achieving success in recovering for misappropriation of the
products they have expended large amounts of time and money
developing. Despite this fact, proprietors should be aware of
the possible impediments to legally safeguarding their products
and should take independent action to prevent piracy by others.

298. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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APPENDIX I

Original Patents Issued Per
Fiscal Year For TC 2700
27000
26000
25000
24000
23000
22000
21000
20000
19000
18000
17000
16000
15000
14000
13000
12000
11000
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0

A L L A R TS IN
G RO UP 2700
C O M M U N IC A TIO N S
(G ro u p s 2 7 1 0 -2 7 4 0 )
D A TA P R O C E S S IN G
(G ro u p s 2 7 5 0 -2 7 8 0 )

FY99

FY98

FY97

FY96

FY95

FY94

FY93

FY92

FY91

FY90
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APPENDIX II
EXAMINATION PROCEDURES FOR COMPUTER-RELATED INVENTIONS
BOX 1
(Pg 1-2)

BOX 2
(Pg 2-3)

BOX 3
(Pg 3-5, 21-25)

Analyze the Claims

BOX 4
(Pg 5)

Search the Prior Art

BOX 5
(Pg 7)

Classify the claimed invention
as statutory or non-statutory
BOX 9 (Pg 10-11)

BOX 5 (Pg 14)

A Series of Steps
to be performed
on a computer

NO

A Product
(machine or manufacture)
for performing a process

NO

YES

Evaluate Process to
Determine if it...

NO

BOX 12 (Pg 14-17)

A Specific
Machine or
Manufacture

BOX 10
(Pg 11-14)

YES
BOX 11

Performs Independent Physical Acts
(post-computer process activity)
OR
Manipulates Data
representing physical objects
or activities to achieve
a practical application
(pre-computer process activity)

YES
BOX 7

Non-Statutory
Subject Matter

Merely manipulates
abstract idea or
solves a purely
mathematical problem
without any limitation
to a practical application
BOX 14

Statutory
Subject Matter

Statutory
Product

NO

YES

NOTE:
Page references
are to the
Examination
Guidelines
for
Computer-Related
Inventions

Determine what
the Applicant
has invented
and claimed

Determine whether the disclosed invention has
a practical application in the technological arts

BOX 6
(Pg 7-10)

Functional
Descriptive Material
(Data structure per se or
computer program per se)
OR
Non-functional
Descriptive Material
(e.g. music, literary works,
mere data) per se, or
on a computer readable medium
OR
A Natural Phenomenon
(e.g. energy or magnetism)

2/27/96

Read the Specifications and Claims

NO

BOX 13
Pg (17-21)

YES

BOX 15

Non-Statutory
Subject Matter

BOX 16 Pg (25-26)

Determine Compliance with 35 USC Sections 102 and 103
and Prepare an Appropriate Office Action
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IV. Determine Whether the Claimed Invention Complies with 35 U.S.C. § 101

Consider the Breadth of 35 U.S.C. § 101

Classify the Claimed Invention
Functional
Descriptive Material
(data structure per se
or computer program
per se)

Non-functional
Descriptive Material

A Natural Phenomenon YES
(e.g., energy or
magnetism)

or (e.g., music, literary works, or

mere data) per se or on
computer readable
medium

NonStatutory
Subject
Matter

NO

A series of
steps to be
performed on a
computer?

NO

A specific
machine or
manufacture?

A machine or
manufacture for
performing a process

YES

NO

Evaluate process to determine if it...

Performs
independent
physical acts
(post-computer
process activity)

YES

NO
or

Manipulates data representing
physical objects or activities to
achieve a practical application
(pre-computer process activity) YES

Merely manipulates YES
abstract idea or
solves a purely
mathematical
problem without any NO
limitation to a
practical application

Statutory
Product

NonStatutory
Subject
Matter
Statutory
Subject
Matter

